Abstract-This paper presents an approach to IP traceback based on the probabilistic packet marking paradigm. Our approach, which we call randomize-and-link, uses large checksum cords to "link" message fragments in a way that is highly scalable, for the checksums serve both as associative addresses and data integrity verifiers. The main advantage of these checksum cords is that they spread the addresses of possible router messages across a spectrum that is too large for the attacker to easily create messages that collide with legitimate messages.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Modeling the Problem
O
NE OF THE insidious aspects of distributed denial-of-service attacks is that they maliciously use the strength of routers-to move packets quickly-in that they exploit many different compromised hosts as "zombies" to fire packets at a victim. In order to model distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, we consider the attack as propagating in a tree , where the root of the tree is the victim, , and each node in corresponds to a router on the Internet that is downstream from an attack host to the victim. From the perspective of , the tree is a subtree of a much larger universal tree that consists of the union of all routes to . (See Fig. 1 .)
The goal in the traceback problem is to identify the leaves of , that is, the routers upstream from the victim closest to attack hosts. We model the attacker as an adversary, , who can compromise many hosts and use them as "zombies" in a DDOS attack. We allow that may have knowledge about our traceback algorithms, and that he can even try to design his DDOS attack so as to confuse, break, or delay our algorithms, by "spoofing" the IP headers of attack packets. In this context, we define a DDOS attack to consist of a stream of many attacks packets sent from the attack hosts to the victim (in an attempt to overwhelm the victim). We assume that the attacker cannot compro- mise routers, however. In so doing, can make it difficult for us to identify some of the routers in the attack tree . In addition, we allow that may know the IP addresses of routers in the Internet; hence, he can try to trick us so as to implicate routers not in . A major challenge in the IP traceback problem is that there are over 400 million hosts on the Internet. Conservatively assuming that there is a router for every 100-200 hosts on the Internet, we therefore estimate the number of routers (internal nodes) in to be at least two million. Thus, in practical terms, solving the IP traceback problem amounts to correctly identifying a few thousand of the million internal nodes in as forming the leaves of the attack tree . Ideally, we would like to do this identification without requiring any a priori knowledge of the universal tree on the part of the victim , for such information could be difficult to obtain and maintain.
Finally, we desire solutions to the IP traceback problem that are fast and efficient. We prefer solutions that minimize the amount of additional traffic on the Internet needed to solve the traceback problem or create an infrastructure for solving it. Likewise, we want to allow for incremental adoption by routers in any new infrastructure needed for traceback, and we want to minimize the amount of state that must be maintained by routers. That is, if only a subset of routers on the Internet implement our protocol, then we want our traceback algorithm to still work correctly, in this case to identify the leaves of the tree . In addition, the computations needed on the part of the victim to identify the leaves of the attack tree should be fast enough so that can quickly reconstruct .
B. Pattern-Based Filtering and Hop-by-Hop Tracing
In some cases, such as in reflector-based attacks, we can use patterns in the attack packets to filter out DDOS packets at a firewall. Likewise, the approach of hop-by-hop tracing, which is also known as link testing, uses a pattern-based approach to do traceback of a DOS attack while it is in progress. This is the approach of the automated Pushback mechanism [8] , for example, and it is the solution currently supported manually by many router manufacturers. In this approach, a network administrator or his/her agent logs into the routers nearest the victim, and using statistics and pattern analysis, determines the next upstream routers in the attack tree . The approach is then repeated at the upstream routers for as long as the attack continues. This scheme therefore requires immediate action during the attack, and requires considerable coordination between network administrators (to either communicate directly or setup access points for the agents of partnering administrators). This technique also requires some pattern-based way to separate legitimate packets from attack packets. A similar approach is used by Burch and Cheswick [4] to perform traceback by iteratively flooding from portions of the Internet to see its effects on 's incoming traffic. Unfortunately, because of their iterative nature, these approaches have limited traceback capabilities in a large-scale DDOS attack.
C. ICMP Messaging
An alternative approach, based on ICMP messaging [3] , is to have each router decide, with some probability (typically, is mentioned), for each packet to send an additional ICMP packet to the destination, which identifies and some content of . The main idea of this approach is that during a DDOS, a sufficient amount of attack packets will trigger ICMP messages from the routers in the attack tree so that the victim can identify the leaves of from these messages. The main drawback of this approach is that it causes additional network traffic even when no DDOS is present. Even so, it is not efficient, for identifying the leaf nodes in the attack tree requires, according to the analysis of the coupon collectors problem (e.g., see Motwani and Raghavan [10] ), an expected number of packets are needed to arrive at the victim, where is the th Harmonic number. For example, if , then the expected number of attack packets needing to arrive at the victim before will have sufficient information to identify the leaves of is 138 million.
D. Logging
In addition to the hop-by-hop and ICMP messaging approaches, several researchers have advocated a logging approach to the IP traceback problem. In a logging solution, we either ask routers to log the packets they process or we augment the data packets themselves to contain a full log of all the routers they have encountered on their way to their destinations. Stone [14] and Baba and Matsuda [2] advocate logging of packet information at the routers, and Snoeren et al. [12] propose the logging of message digests of packets at the routers. The drawback with these approaches is that they require additional storage at the routers.
E. Probabilistic Packet Marking
An intriguing alternative solution to the IP traceback problem is probabilistic packet marking. This traceback approach, which we follow in this paper, can be applied during or after an attack, and it does not require any additional network traffic, router storage, or packet size increase.
Probabilistic packet marking was originally introduced by Savage et al. [11] . In this approach to the IP traceback problem, each router performs, for each packet it processes, an information injection event that occurs with a set probability (e.g.,
). The information injection involves using bits in the IP header that are typically not used or changed by routers (they identify the 16-bit IP identification field). They use 5 bits of this field for a hop count, which helps their reconstruction algorithm. The remaining bits are used for the message that the router wishes to send. If that message is too big, they break it into fragments and use the bits of usable IP header to store a fragment offset and its data fragment. By then including a hash interleaved with the message , the victim can reconstruct from the packets it receives during the DOS attack. Their algorithm is quite interesting, as it introduces the packet marking framework, and does not require a priori knowledge of the universal tree . But their algorithm, unfortunately, is not practical for large DDOS attacks. In particular, their algorithm for reconstructing a message from a router at distance from the victim requires checksum tests, where is the number of routers in at distance from and is the number of fragments messages have been divided into (and this bound generously assumes there are no "noise" packets from the adversary). For example, if and , then the victim has to perform over 650 trillion checksum tests in order to reconstruct each of the 30 messages. Such a computation is, of course, not feasible for the victim, and even if it were, it would introduce many false positives. Moreover, this scheme is easily spoofed by an adversary who knows this algorithm.
Song and Perrig [13] improve the performance of probabilistic packet marking and suggest the use of hash chains for authenticating routers. They also use a 5-bit distance field, but they do not fragment router messages. Instead, they assume the victim knows the universal tree , and they include a -bit XOR of hashed message authentication codes (HMACs) from each router and its downstream neighbor . Once a time-released key is revealed, which is a computation performed out-of-band, the victim uses his/her knowledge of and the revealed keys to determine which routers have marked the given packets. The computation proceeds breadth-first from , so that each phase requires HMAC tests, where denotes the number of routers in at distance from and denotes the number of routers in the universal graph at distance from . For example, if and we conservatively estimate that the number of routers in at distance is 100 000, then their algorithm would perform 5 million HMAC tests to determine the routers at distance in . Summing over distances to (and assuming that near-by tests are faster), implies a total of at least 100 million HMAC tests, which is several orders of magnitude better than a similar reconstruction in the Savage et al. approach. Such a computation is still a great effort for the victim, of course, but it is at least feasible. Unfortunately, using an 11-bit HMAC implies that over 45 000 of these tests will be validated at random. Thus, the authentication aspects of their algorithm has scalability issues in addition to the drawback of requiring knowledge of .
Dean et al. [5] introduce an algebraic approach to probabilistic packet marking, where a router will mark the reusable bits of a packet with probability , as in the previous schemes, but the marking information is the value of a linear polynomial with 's identity as its leading coefficient. Any subsequent router not initiating a similar computation nevertheless changes the -bits by performing an iteration of Horner's rule to create an evaluation of a new polynomial having the IP addresses of the routers on the path from to as its coefficients. Thus, in order to reconstruct each path in the attack tree, the victim must perform polynomial interpolation with noise on the packets it has received. Dean et al. identify 25 bits in the IP header that can be used for marking, namely, 16 bits from the ID field used in fragmentation (which is used only 0.25% of the time), 8 type-of-service bits, and one flag bit (which is also used in fragmentation). Unfortunately, their interpolate-with-noise algorithms are complex and slow for large distributed denial-of-service attacks.
Lee et al. [9] show how to add statistical analysis to an existing probabilistic packet marking scheme, so that, in addition to identifying the routers that are downstream from attack hosts, they can estimate the average traffic rate for each edge in the attack tree. Their scheme appears to work with any probabilistic packet marking scheme, so combining it with our approach should allow for traffic analysis of larger attack trees.
F. Our Results
In this paper we introduce a novel approach to probabilistic packet marking, which we call the randomize-and-link approach, that greatly improves the practicality and security of probabilistic packet marking. The main idea of our approach is to have each router fragment its message into several words and include in the reusable bits such a word fragment at random together with a large checksum cord on the entire message . For example, if , we may wish to include 14 bits of a checksum cord in every marked packet. Such an approach to packet marking may at first seem counterintuitive, for we are apparently wasting a large amount of "real estate" in the precious bits. But the checksum cords make the reconstruction algorithm much more efficient. The checksum cords serve both as associative addresses for the router messages and also as partial integrity validators. They also spread the spectrum of possible messages across a large domain, which significantly reduces the ability of the adversary to interject false messages that collide with legitimate ones. In addition, by including reasonably large HMAC information in the message , we can achieve unpredictability for these checksum cords, which makes the adversary's job harder, while also providing moderate-to-strong authentication of the routers in the attack tree . Moreover, our algorithms do not require any knowledge of the universal tree , and we avoid the requirement of having routers sign individual setup messages by employing authenticated dictionaries [1] , [7] for the out-of-band validations. In addition, our scheme can be deployed incrementally-not all routers need be using our scheme in order for it to work. 
II. EFFICIENT PACKET MARKING
Let denote the number of bits in the IP header that we can safely use to encode information from a router. For example, we may wish to use , as advocated by Dean et al. [5] . Indeed, we will use as a running example throughout most of this paper. Still, even if one does not use the 8 type-of-service bits (which are being advocated for differentiated services), we would still have (and we give some examples using this value for as well). In either case, we may sometimes upset packet fragmentation, but the frequency of fragmentation is arguably below typical packet loss rates [5] .
A. High-Level View
Our scheme for sending to the message from each router in the attack tree is based on using a technique that we call randomize-and-link. The main idea of this technique is to perform the following transformation on : 1) Pad as needed to make a multiple of , which is a parameter in our algorithm. 2) Compute a reasonably large (and statistically random) checksum on the sequence . The checksum should utilize randomness in itself or , so that is statistically random (like a random hash function) and unpredictable to the adversary. 3) Break into a sequence of nonoverlapping word fragments . 4) Create a collection of blocks, which are used to overwrite the bits, so . Thus, the block consists of an index, checksum cord, and a message fragment. (See Fig. 2.) We use these blocks to transmit the message to the victim . These pieces are not sent in any particular order, however. We call the cord for , as it will be used as both an associative address for and a checksum to "link" all the pieces of back together. Moreover, since the cord is statistically random and unpredictable to the attacker, he cannot easily create false cords that would confuse the reconstruction algorithm. This reconstruction algorithm is therefore quite simple-given a collection of 's with the same cord , a victim simply tries all possible ways of putting the 's back together in the right order, using the checksum property of the cord to eliminate unintended sequences. Once the victim has a valid sequence of 's correctly constructed in order, will have built the message . We give the details below. (See also Fig. 3 .) 
B. Randomize-and-Link Transmission
As mentioned above, we assume that the IP header allows the reuse of some of its bits for the purpose of information marking by routers. We partition the reusable bits in the IP header as follows:
• bits for the fragment index • bits for the cord, which serves both as an associative address and as a checksum • bits for the data word . For example, if and , then we could use bits for the index , bits for the checksum , and bits for each data word . We assume that either the function or itself contain a sufficient randomness so that the checksum value is statistically random and unpredictable to the adversary. That is, it is as unlikely as a random hash function with similar output size for for two different router messages and . In particular, we want to be unpredictable to an adversary who knows only the value of (we assume the adversary does not know all of ). For example, if does not contain sufficient randomness in itself, we could pad with a random nonce.
We pad to have a size that is a multiple of and we compute the -bit checksum cord on , and we break into a sequence of words of length bits each. We define a set of blocks so that . Note that the cord is included in every block . Indeed, it is the inclusion of the cord that links the blocks together, as it makes an associative address for the blocks.
C. Packet Marking
Once we have the blocks defined for a message , we proceed with probabilistic packet marking in the natural way. Namely, we define a probability parameter (e.g.,
). With each packet that receives, we "flip a coin" with probability . If this coin comes up "tails" (an event that occurs with probability ), then simply forwards the packet on to its destination as usual. Otherwise, if the coin comes up "heads," then chooses one of its blocks at random, inserts into the reusable bits of this packet (updating the header checksum as needed), and forwards this revised packet on to its destination.
This packet marking process continues until we choose, for timeliness reasons, to change the message . At such a time that we wish to change to a new , the router repeats that above computation for the blocks for the new message. The router then repeats the probabilistic packet marking for this new set of blocks, until we decide yet another change is needed. Thus, we keep very little state at a router in order to implement the randomize-and-link packet marking scheme. A router does not even need to store the blocks , so long as it has a fast way of generating a at random. Moreover, note that the computational overhead per packet is very small. In the default case, when the "coin flip" is tails, the router's work is the same as if it were doing no packet marking at all; hence, this scheme can be deployed incrementally.
D. Message Reconstruction
The message reconstruction algorithm is based on a simple combinatorial process. Given a set of packets received at the victim, we sort their -bit blocks lexicographically by their values, and remove duplicates (interpreting values according to the same format we used to store blocks in the IP header). This sorting can be done, for example by a radix sort. Thus, we have, for each distinct cord , all the distinct blocks for this cord ordered by their -index. We let denote the set of distinct packets that have cord and fragment index . We then try all combinatorial combinations of the blocks in , computing a checksum for each. We keep only those combinations that have a checksum equal to the cord . That is, we accept these strings as being strong candidates as having been sent from the routers (although we must recognize that some of these may have been sent by the attacker). (See Fig. 4 .) The total running time, then, for this reconstruction algorithm at the victim is proportional to the following quantity: where is the total number of packets and is the number of distinct packets from this set with cord and fragment index .
E. Two-Phase Fragmentation
In the above discussion, we argued how fragmenting a message into small blocks indexed (that is, linked) by a large statistically random checksum cord can be an effective means for sending a message to the victim that is longer than bits. In particular, fragmenting a message into two, four, or eight word fragments can be an efficient way to send a moderate-sized message to the victim (say, on the order of 48 to 96 bits). Unfortunately, if we have a larger-sized message (say, on the order of 128 or 192 bits), eight fragments may not be sufficient to send the message and still utilize a large checksum cord (which is needed for both security and message reconstruction). We can iterate our randomize-and-link approach, however, to send larger messages. We begin as in our previous method. We take the message and subdivide it into words, . This subdivision should be done in such as way as to preserve in each word the same degree of randomness as is present globally in the message . Still, in many cases where we want to be reasonably large, we may observe that each word is too big to be transported with high confidence in a single data block. So we further subdivide each word into subwords . Given the value and the size of the subwords, we determine the number, , of checksum bits that we can devote to sending the subwords in the first round (given our fixed size of bits per block). We devote bits to the data in each subword . Thus, we can compose subwords to form bigger blocks of bits. In order for these big blocks to have the same security as the smaller blocks, we should devote bits to a random checksum cord for each of them, just as we did in our single-phase approach. This factor is due to the fact that the probability of collision between two distinct packets in the first round is and this probability in the second round is , since every round-two word was comprised of round-one subwords. In addition, we must also devote bits to a fragment number of each index . So, for each word we compute a -bit checksum cord we wish to use in order to achieve high confidence of message transmission for each word. (See Fig. 5.) Data transmission in the two-level scheme is as in the onelevel scheme, except that now when a router decides to interject a message into a packet it chooses one of its many subwords, at random and interjects this. Reconstruction of the message, of course, proceeds in two phases. In the first phase we reconstruct all the candidate words and in the second phase we reconstruct all the candidate messages. Thus, the running time for message reconstruction in the two-phase scheme is proportional to the following:
where is the total number of packets the victim is using for reconstruction, is the number of distinct phase-one blocks from this set with cord and fragment index , and is the number of distinct phase-two blocks with cord and fragment index . In the analysis section that follows, we show that these quantities can be quite reasonable, provided that there are a sufficient number of bits devoted to the checksum cords.
III. ANALYSIS
We begin our analysis by estimating the number of packets that are needed for traceback in our single-phase method. Let denote the number of leaf routers in the attack tree , and recall that is the number of words in the message each router wishes to transmit to the victim . Thus, the victim wishes to receive distinct packets if we are to reconstruct the messages from all the leaf routers in .
Let denote the probability that a router inserts its information into a packet that it is routing. So, is the probability that a packet is marked and arrives unchanged from a router that is hops away from . If we conservatively assume that all routers have their packets successfully delivered with probability at least that of the farthest routers, then we can safely estimate that the information from some leaf router in the attack tree will be contained in a packet received by the victim with probability at least , where is the maximum hop-distance for any such router.
Since every router must successfully send different blocks for all of its information to arrive at the victim, the expected number of packets that must be received before all fragments have been received is an instance of the coupon collectors problem [10] , where the number of "coupons" is and the probability of receiving a marked packet is at least . This observation implies that the expected number of packets that must arrive at the victim before it can identify the leaf routers of is at most where denotes the th Harmonic number. Using a wellknown inequality for where is Euler's constant. Thus, the expected number of packets that must arrive at before it can perform a complete traceback of routers using our scheme is at most For example, if , , , and , then the expected number of needed packets to do reconstruction of all the leaf router messages is 76 516, not considering the minimum packet marking probability, . Dividing this expectation by the minimum packet marking probability in this case implies that the expected total number of packets needed by the victim to do complete reconstruction of all messages is at most 2 428 118. Note that there are only distinct packets that come from the leaf routers in the attack tree. The challenge for the attacker is that he cannot predict the checksum cords; hence, it is unlikely that the packets that get routed to the victim without marking (which occurs with probability ) will be confused for marked packets.
The analysis of the two-phase version of the randomize-andlink algorithm is similar to that given above for the single-phase version. The main difference is that in the two-phase algorithm we wish to receive, from each router, words subdivided into subwords. That is, we wish to receive packets from each leaf router in . Thus, the expected number of packets we have to receive in order to do complete traceback is Let us address next the expected running time needed to reconstruct all the messages received by the victim. We give the analysis first for our single-phase algorithm, and we then explain the slight differences for our two-phase algorithm.
The important observation in analyzing the expected running time of the message reconstruction algorithm is that, since the checksum cords are statistically random, we can view the mapping of messages to checksum indices as a random hash function. Thus, the number of collisions among legitimate messages should be small. Of course, the adversary might construct lots of fake messages and then construct lots of collisions with these messages, but let us ignore this possibility for the time being (we will revisit this possibility shortly).
We begin with the reconstruction algorithm for our singlephase scheme. Let denote the number of distinct packets the victim has received and let denote the number of routers in the attack tree. Since there are pieces to each message and each one has a -bit checksum cord that is statistically random, the probability that two random packets have the same fragment index and cord is . In addition, the probability that two router-sent packets have the same fragment index and cord is at most , since any router wishing to send a message will send a packet with each -index for the checksum cord it is using. Thus, the expected number of packets with the same fragment index and cord is at most . For any given cord , then, the running time for computing all combinatorial combinations of blocks with this cord is proportional to , where is a random variable corresponding to the number of packets with fragment index (for this checksum cord ). Since these 's refer to different fragment indices, they are independent; hence, the expected value of their product is equal to the product of their expected values. That is, the expected running time for checking all the combinations for a given checksum cord is . Summing this expectation over the at most possible cord values, we see that the expected number of checksum tests in the message reconstruction phase is where the bound comes from the fact that we have to have at least different fragments for a given checksum cord before we will have to perform an actual checksum test. So, for example, if , , , and , then the expected number of checksum tests the victim must make is only 10 000.
The adversary has little advantage in our two-phase algorithm, as well, although the total number of packets needed in this case is somewhat greater than in the single-phase approach. Specifically, in the two-phase algorithm, each router sends a total of fragments. The victim first assembles these as -length subwords, and then assembles the words produced from this reconstruction. If the first phase uses -bit checksum cords and the second phase uses -bit checksum cords, then the expected number of checksum tests is The arguments justifying this bound are similar to those above, but applied twice. So, for example, if , , , , , and , then the expected number of checksum tests the victim must make is 10 000.
Of course, the adversary may deliberately send false messages that have valid checksum cords according by our scheme. But the number of such messages is limited, for the adversary must be limited to the same coupon collector bounds as the legitimate routers in . To estimate the number of such false messages, let us conservatively assume that the probability that a packet arrives unchanged from the adversary is equal to the probability that the victim receives a packet marked by a router. Thus, the maximum number of false messages the adversary can send is bounded by , the number of legitimate routers in the attack tree. Still, the adversary may not only try to send us false message with valid checksum cords. He may also send lots of Fig. 6 . Message sizes for the given fragmentation schemes and checksum lengths, assuming b = 25 is the bit length of individual blocks. A fragment scheme identified by "x" indicates a scheme with x number of bits used to index fragments. A fragment scheme identified by "x + y" indicates a two-phase fragmentation scheme where the first round uses x bits for the fragment index and the second round uses y bits for the fragment index. We index the checksum needs in the two-phase schemes by c , since we can set c = c 0 dlog le. extra packets that have checksum cords that deliberately collide with each other, so as to make us do extra wasteful work trying in vain to find a combination of these word fragments that have a checksum equal to this cord. Fortunately, as we show below, we can apply a probabilistic packet filtering strategy to our algorithm that significantly limits the amount of extra work the adversary can force us to do in combining colliding word fragments.
We can derive a high-probability upper bound on the running time of the message reconstruction algorithm, which is useful for identifying improbably large numbers of collisions that are most likely deliberately sent by the adversary in an attempt to slow down our traceback algorithm. Armed with this high-probability bound, we can safely discard packets that define an improbably large number of collisions in reconstructing the blocks for a specific cord . Let us fix a checksum cord , and let , where denotes the number of distinct blocks with fragment index and cord . We will bound and thereby derive a bound on . We will utilize the following Chernoff bound (e.g., see Motwani and Raghavan [10] ):
Theorem 1 (Chernoff Bound Theorem): Let be the sum of independent indicator (0/1) random variables, and let denote the expected value of . Then Corollary 2: Let be the sum of independent indicator (0/1) random variables, and let denote the expected value of . For any Returning to our analysis, then, note that can be defined as the sum of independent indicator random variables and that the expected value of is . Thus, in the single-phase algorithm, is . Thus, we have: Lemma 3: Suppose . Then, for any integer hence Thus, we can bound with this same probability that the odds that . So, for example, if , , , , and , then the probability that is less than , which is a very small number. Thus, in this example, we may safely discard the packets for any index that have more than 24 packets. That is, we may safely discard any subproblems that would cause us to perform more than checksum tests. With high probability, such a subproblem will not occur at random, so it most likely was sent to us by the adversary in an attempt to make us do extra unnecessary work in our single-phase traceback algorithm. A similar analysis can be done for the two-phase algorithm.
A. Trading Off Message and Cord Size
As we observed above, increasing the checksum size leads to higher security. A large checksum makes the space of possible messages addresses large, which in turn makes it more difficult for the adversary to interject false messages that collide with legitimate ones. Of course, this increased security has a cost. Namely, as the checksum becomes larger, the bits left over for the message must go down. Even so, there are still several strong choices for checksum lengths and fragmentation schemes that allow for message sizes long enough to do authenticated IP traceback. We show in Fig. 6 the maximum message size for various randomize-and-link fragmentation schemes, assuming , and we show similar information for in Fig. 7 .
B. Sufficient Packet Volume
We have described the randomize-and-link strategy in a general way, so as to allow for several possible message sizes. But we should also recognize that reconstructing large messages requires more packets. Moreover, the number of needed packets also increases with the number of routers in the attack tree. In order to keep the reconstruction algorithm fast, we prefer that expected number of collisions between a given packet and any other packet be less than 2. The randomize-and-link algorithm will still work for higher expectations, but it is most efficient when the expected collision size is less than 2. Thus, we have worked out the needed packet volume and checksum bit-length for various randomize-and-link fragmentation schemes under various numbers of routers in the attack tree. We provide this information in Figs. 8 and 9 .
We have performed an experimental simulation of our scheme to test empirically the average number of packets that must be Fig. 8 . Expected upper bounds on N, the number of packets that need to be received for various fragmentation schemes and number of routers, n, in the attack tree. The volumes given are the expected number needed to cover all the routers. To convert the presented numbers to an expectation that factors in the marking probability, the above values should be divided by p (1 0 p) . Fig. 9 . The checksum sizes needed for the different randomize-and-link fragmentation schemes, assuming various values of the number of leaf routers, n, in the attack tree. The checksum sizes given are the number needed to force the expected collision size to be less than 2. For the two-phase schemes, the checksum size is given for the first round, since its checksum needs are higher.
received by a victim before it can identify all the leaf routers in an attack tree . We used a complete binary tree for and assumed that packets were being generated at attack hosts uniformly at random. Experiments were performed to test the average number of packets needed by a victim to identify all of 1000 attack hosts that were 10 hops away, for varying values of the marking probability . Average packet frequencies are reported in Fig. 10 for the total number of packets and the number of unmarked packets. Note that, for high probabilities, most packets are marked, but not by leaf nodes in , while, for low probabilities, most packets are unmarked. Fortunately, the results show that as long as the probability is roughly equal to the inverse of the distance to the attack hosts, the number of total packets needed to identify all the leaves of is reasonable.
IV. ROUTER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we discuss how our packet marking algorithm could fit into a complete IP traceback scheme. This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, however, as the randomize-and-link approach only specifies the length of the information that is sent from the routers in an attack tree to the victim. The main point we want to make in the following discussion, then, is to show how the randomize-and-link strategy can be used to create a traceback method that scales to thousands of routers, that does not require the victim know the universal tree , and that can authenticate routers without requiring them individually to sign setup messages.
As mentioned above, our general approach is based on the existence of a message that a router will transmit so that it includes 's identity. That is, includes 's 32-bit IP address. Additionally, if we want to learn edges of the attack tree , as opposed to simply learning the names of all the leaf routers in , we can optionally have each router also include in the name of its downstream router in , which would add another 32 bits to . This identity and optional topology information, of course, does not provide any additional randomness or authentication information to , as is needed by the security needs of a good randomize-and-link traceback scheme. Fortunately, there are several ways that we can simultaneously add randomness and authentication to . Before we describe one of these ways, however, let us briefly review the main cryptographic tool that this method is based on.
A. Authenticated Dictionaries
One possible authentication scheme utilizes an authenticated dictionary for some portions of the task of authenticating routers. An authenticated dictionary [1] , [7] consists of a trusted source and many untrusted directories. The trusted source produces and maintains a dictionary database, , of objects, stored as key-value pairs, , while the directories answer key-value queries for on behalf of client users. In requesting a key-value query, a client provides a key and asks the directory to return the object in that has as its key. If there is such an object, then the directory returns it. If, on the other hand, there is no object with key in , then the directory returns a special "no-such-object" value. In either case, in addition to the answer a directory gives, a directory also provides a cryptographic proof of that answer, which validates (subject to standard cryptographic assumptions) that the answer is current and is as accurate as if it had come directly from the source. There is a small (usually logarithmic) overhead incurred for this cryptographic proof, but it allows the source to be offline during the request. In addition, by deploying many directories widely dispersed in the network, using an authenticated dictionary allows us to reduce response latency and the effectiveness of a denial-of-service attack on the authenticated dictionary itself (for such an attack would have to target all of the directories simultaneously). We describe below how authenticated dictionaries can be used in various traceback schemes to allow for strong authentication of routers without requiring them to sign any setup messages individually.
B. HMAC With Individual Key Exposure
One way to do router authentication is to determine, for each router , a sequence of secret keys . Then, with a message intended for a victim , the router includes a hashed message authentication code (HMAC) of , where is a one-way cryptographic hash function and is a time-quantum counter that is of sufficient granularity that we can assume rough synchronization between routers and the victim. We include in the HMAC so as to reduce the possibility of a replay attack. We reveal the key for each router in time quantum . The revelation is done using an authenticated dictionary for each autonomous system (AS), whose source is the administrator of the AS. Indeed, we assume this administrator distributed the secret keys to his or her routers in the first place. To determine the amount of extra space this scheme adds to the message , note that we did not include the packet's source address in the HMAC, as is done, for example, in a previous scheme [13] , for this value is set by the adversary. Thus, there is no risk of a birthday attack for our hash function , as its data is fixed for and the current time quantum . This scheme will therefore add 32, 48, or 64 bits to depending on whether we want fair, moderate, or strong authentication of .
1) HMAC With Messaged Key Exposure:
An alternate scheme to the previous authentication method is to utilize a sequence of secret keys, , as before, but include in during time quantum . In this way, the router itself reveals the secret key used in the HMAC. In this case, we should create the sequence of keys themselves as a hash chain using a one-way cryptographic hash function, , so that . Then we need only store in the authenticated dictionary for 's autonomous system. For given any revealed , the victim can determine the authenticity of this key by performing applications of the function . Thus, this approach reduces the work required of the AS administrator, so that rather than revealing keys with each time quantum, the administrator now just needs to reveal the base of each router's hash chain. The trade-off is that we now are including more information in . Namely, we are adding 64, 96, or 128 bits to , depending on whether we want fair, moderate, or strong authentication of . In addition, since the keys are determined through a hash chain, we now require the victim to perform hash computations for every router in the attack tree. This effort can be significant if the number of routers in is over 1000.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have presented a new approach to IP traceback based on the probabilistic packet marking paradigm. Our approach, which we call randomize-and-link, uses large checksum cords to link message fragments in a way that is highly scalable, for the cords serve both as associative addresses and data integrity verifiers. For example, with a 12-bit checksum cord we can use a single-phase randomize-and-link scheme to produce an 80-bit message that contains a router's 32-bit IP address and a 48-bit combination HMAC. Such a scheme would allow for fast and efficient message reconstruction for up to 500 routers in the attack tree . If we wish to traceback efficiently attacks that are targeting a victim through a larger attack tree, we could use a 16-bit initial checksum cord in a two-phase randomize-and-link strategy (using 8 subwords in phase one and 4 words in phase two) that produces a 128-bit message. Such a message could contain a router 's IP address, the IP address of the downstream neighbor of , and a 64-bit HMAC (collective or individual). Or such a message could contain 's IP address, a 48-bit HMAC, and a 48-bit key revelation. In either case, using a 16-bit checksum cord with a two-phase scheme producing a 128-bit message would allow for fast and efficient traceback for attack trees of size up to 2000 routers. In general, our methods do not require that a victim know the topology of the universal tree , we do not require that routers sign any setup messages individually, and we allow for incremental adoption (for the default router action is to process packets in the same way as a nonparticipating router).
